Patrick Hurley, America's Worst China Diplomat
During 1944-5, on the eve of Japanese surrender, the USA faced a crisis in
China. Chiang Kai Shek(“cash my check”,
Truman called him. Truman knew a parasite
when he saw one). CSK and Stilwell were
famously not getting along. At times it
seemed that Stilwell had less cachet with the White House than even Soong May
Ling did. Stilwell was frustrated that
CSK simply wasn’t using the military supplies he was receiving from the USA to
defeat the Japanese.
And Chennault and Stilwell were bitter rivals, themselves. So FDR decided to send one of his most
trusted emissaries, albeit a Republican, to China to help FDR see things a bit
more clearly. He was trusted with
meeting both sides of the coming Civil War in China. His name was Patrick Hurley, and Mr. Hurley’s
impact on US-Sino relations lasted far longer than his short term as emissary
turned Ambassador. He thus earns my vote as The Worst American
Diplomat Ever in China.
Don’t get me wrong. Mr. Hurley
himself was reasonably competent, and he actually served admirably enough
during WW2 to gain the confidence of both Gen Marshall and the President. It was his ability to gain FDR’s trust, along
with Marshall’s, that gained him the opportunity to shape US-Sino relations in
the first place.
In hindsight, sending Hurley to China, ignorant of Asia as he was,
certainly counts as incomprehensible today.
Yet his success to date serving in other roles for FDR did not hint at
failure in his role as China Envoy at the time.
It was his disastrous experience in China, at the time when the West
needed more than anything an informed, non ideological diplomat on the ground,
that certainly prejudiced Mao towards Westerners, and American envoys in
particular.
America needed a fellow that would
go in with an open mind. Instead it
sent a fellow with experience in Russia, where his distaste for Communism was
only hardened, into a situation that required the ability to compartmentalize previous
experiences when making a judgment. Instead,
what Uncle Sam sent was a virulently anti-Communist diplomat to China. (Mao
called Hurley a “clown”) Like others of
his day, he assumed China and Russia were merely part of a global “cabal”.
It did not help that Hurley was himself a patrician, lawyer
capitalist. Mao simply did not fit into
his world view.
His unwillingness to objectively look at the situation at hand, to accept
the expertise of the “boots on the ground”, ie John Davies and John Service,
gave great discredit to not only their future careers, but to any possibility of there being an objective
analysis of the situation at hand. Hurley’s
incessant paranoia towards the “career men” did not help. Minimizing the input of America’s brightest,
most thoughtful China Analysts simply because they didn’t fit into Hurley’s
philosophy, itself did great damage to America’s ability to anticipate the path
China would take.
For instance, and this is admittedly conjecture, if the above had been
allowed to maintain their postings within China, which Hurley went to great lengths
to abolish, and if their views had been encouraged, it’s possible the USA would
have maintained diplomatic relations with China, albeit on icy terms. It’s possible the Chinese intervention in
Korea would not have taken place. It’s
possible the USA could’ve filled the Russian vacuum once the Soviets withdrew
from China.
This is important to note because of the access Hurley had to the White
House. It is fair to say if his views
were otherwise, the USA and the West by extension may have had a more
sophisticated view of the Communist leadership, and of the Movement
itself. It is fair to surmise the “Who
Lost China?” witch hunt that took place after the Fall of China may have thus
been avoided. Thus the appointment of
Hurley to such a sensitive role certainly counts as a “missed opportunity” for
the United States to better gauge the future of China, and how the West could
have played a role.
Any future rethinking of the above Question may certainly start at Hurley’s
Door.
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