Mao wins in the end.....Part 4
Lu Dingyi was no Wu Han.
He was no intellectual. No chronicler
of Ming History. But like Wu Han he was
one of Peng Zhen’s “men”. Indeed, his
prestige within the Party was quite impressive.
A veteran of the Long March. His
Communist Pedigree was beyond reproach.
Unlike Wu Han, he had not secretly joined the CCP. Indeed, he rose so high and so far, he nearly
made it into the Politburo itself. Making
only “alternate” status.
Lu Dingyi was a true Red.
Lu Dingyi knew everyone. He was no mere “Revolutionary”.
Lu Dingyi also controlled the Beijing newspapers. He controlled
The Press. And in accordance with Peng Zhen, and Liu Shaoqi, believed politics
should be kept out of the military, the economy, and well…everything. And Mao disagreed.
Mao felt Politics should be the guiding principle for
everything.
Yao Wenyuan’s article was thus blocked from being published
in Beijing. Thus it was not published in
the People’s Daily. China’s version of
the New York Time and Washington Post rolled into one.
And until it could get published Mao was left to stew in his
Hangzhou villa.
It was then that Mao finally realized the only way to go
after who he really wanted to topple, which was everyone not aligned with him,
ie nearly the entire Communist Leadership Establishment, was not by frontal
attack, but through more indirect means.
In the past I’ve spoken of Halberstam’s book The Best and Brightest. How America’s leaders, despite their skill,
their experience, their overbearing intelligence, their Rand credentials, still
managed to bog American down in the Vietnam War.
Well, Mao wanted to take his version of The Best and
Brightest and for lack of a better phrase, “wipe them out”. Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, Yang Shangkun,
Peng DeHuai, Peng Zhen, etc. His
vision of a Future China would not include them. The future of China could only be written by
one man.
One by one they would fall by the wayside. Imprisoned, death in prison, etc. There is nothing
Anti-Chinese about
this: these are facts.
The beginning salvo was his decision to destroy something of
his own creation; he chose to go after something called the “Five Man Group”. This committee was to tackle the vague
problem of “culture”. Mao wished to make
culture more a tool of the Party. And
culture included plays, and one play in particular came to mind: Hai Rui Dismissed from Office.
Peng Zhen, the leader of the committee like everyone else
was surprised by Yao Wenyuan’s vitriolic attack on his protégé, Wu Han. As was Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, the
promoters of a more practical (read liberal and capitalist) economy.
In essence, this Yao Wenyuan threatened them all. They knew it and Mao knew it, and Mao knew
they knew it.
In early 1966, Peng Zhen struck back and declared there was
nothing wrong with Wu Han’s play; it was an academic exercise only and
certainly not an attack on Mao. Peng
than waited for Mao’s next move.
Its here we have to stop again and ponder one more time the
What If’s of Chinese History….?
First of all Peng Zhen was most foolish allowing Wu Han
unfettered license to publish such an explosive play. Yet one most remember the only reason it was
made into a Peking Opera was because of its original popularity in pure story
form. The People loved it! Yet the People simply took it at face
value. Probably only in a population of
600 million were there more than maybe a few thousand that really knew what was
taking place.
As one wonders what would have happened IF Sun Weishi had
simply married Lin Biao and IF Sun Weishi had not beaten out Jiang Qing for the
lead role in some long forgotten play and along with Wang Guangmei usurped her place
in the female hierarchy, what if that dumbass Peng Zhen had simply stamped out
Wu Han’s play? Better yet, just not allow it to be made into an Opera for all
the world to see?
While writing this I realized I was wrong about something
I’d earlier mentioned. Lu Shan was NOT
the last time China’s establishment would have to peacefully keep the Chairman
retired. Rather the last time was the
interlude between 1962 and 1966. China’s
leaders were different this time around.
While Mao was clearly running China during the 50’s, it was obvious to
all the 60’s were different.
The Chinese Leadership Establishment was running China in the
60’s. Not Mao. By 1962 Mao was nearly 70 years old! A great time to call it quits! Rest on one’s “laurels” if you will. Let others manage the difficulties of
running such a large country. After all,
do revolutionaries make good managers of governments? Let the cogs run the machine.
But Mao just couldn’t let it go and China’s Elite just
couldn’t do what it had to do. Why? Did they think they could outlast him? Ok, fair enough. Did they think they had the numbers game in
their favor? They did. Or was their
deadliest mistake simply to lose their “fear” of The Man?
I think it was. Just
look at Peng Zhen.
Peng Zhen disrespected The Boss and paid the price. He deserved his fate, if only because of his
lack of caution. After all, HIS Laoda
was the President of China!
While Mao couldn’t get his own articles published in
Beijing, and while he stewed pacing back and forth semi-retired in Hangzhou,
all the same he was still The Man.
Mao first laid the groundwork by having Lin Biao fire the
man that had replaced Peng Dehuai as the military commander of China’s army, a
guy named Luo Ruiqing. He then
imprisoned Yang Shangkun, the fellow that managed the day to day operations if
you will, of the Party. With Mao firmly
in control of the Army, and the daily comings and goings of The Machine, he was
ready for his next move. All he had to
do was wait for Peng’s.
Upon Peng Zhen’s Committee of 5 making its declaration, they
unwittingly exposed themselves to Mao. Mao
now had the means at his disposal and he ordered the breakup of the
Committee. After all, hadn’t he created
the committee? He apparently did not
like, nor accept the decision they gave.
And who was on the Committee? Lu
Dingyi of course, the fellow that controlled the People’s Daily. Who else was on the Committee? None other than the editor of the People’s
Daily.
In May of 1966, they were all purged. Lu Dingyi was imprisoned for 13 years. Wu Han was toppled as well. Peng Zhen
was left exposed. He knew it.
With the arrest of both Wu and Lu, Peng was easy
pickings. Peng likewise was imprisoned
until after Mao’s death.
And just like that Mao’s path to Liu Shaoqi was wide open.
One subordinate at a time, Mao was inching closer to his
real target, none other than the President of China himself. Liu Shaoqi knew this, but there was nothing
he could do about it. He was left dangling.
In sum, Mao just outsmarted everyone. China’s leadership never saw Yao Wenyuan
coming. Didn’t know who he was. And they had forgotten all about that most
powerful of weapons that Mao had at his disposal. A weapon they themselves had given him from
early on. Helped develop just for his
use actually. Making sure only The
Chairman Himself possessed it and no one else.
Trusting it would never be used against them.
They had forgotten about Mao’s Cult of Personality. And even more deadly, they had forgotten
about his willingness to use it.
How many times must I bring up Lushan?
What did Mao say than, when in the room facing down Peng
Dehuai, the venerated leader of China’s military and undisputed veteran of
China’s Revolution? The Man that saved
North Korea from extinction!
To paraphrase….
“I’ll go out to the countryside and start my own Army!”
In essence, if they dared to take down Mao, he would simply
start a civil war. That’s all. The unspoken implication being he would win
and they would lose.
One could probably see the fear in their eyes when he said
that.
But they were cowed.
And in a way reasonably so. After all, what had THEY accomplished?
Nothing really.
But by 1966 it was different. The Deng’s, the Liu’s, etc had accomplished
one hell of a lot. And were that more
confident in their abilities. And that
less confident in Mao’s. Let’s be
honest: they had fixed The Chairman’s
mistakes. By 1966 they weren’t as
cowered of The Great Helmsman as they were in 1959.
Shortly afterward Beijing publishes Yao Wenyuan’s rebuke of
Wu Han. For all practical purposes the
real Cultural Revolution had begun.
And just like in 1959, China’s leaders lost their collective
voice. United in bettering China, when
faced with the Will of Mao and this cult of their own making, they were simply
overwhelmed. And China's prestige paid the price.
June, 1966 The People’s Daily calls for the purging of all
“imperialists” from the Chinese government.
The article is obviously aimed at Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi.
July 1966, Liu Shaoqi is demoted. He gives a public speech where Mao infamously
interrupts him several times. He and
Deng Xiaoping are both eventually arrested.
Whereas Liu dies on a cold concrete floor, Deng is only sent to a
tractor factory.
So it is in 1966 China’s economy comes to a full stop. It regresses. Not as long as one may think, though. It only regresses for two or three
years. But the reforms are taken
away. China’s launching pad is removed.
But what if Mao had just stayed in his Hangzhou villa? What if he had simply left well enough alone?
This would have been asking too much of Mao, don’t you
think? How does one walk away from
absolute power? How many emperors have
done this?
When George Washington said he would only serve two terms as
President what did King George lll say in return?
“If he does that he will be the greatest man in the world.”
But history is only fun if we can ask. Mao was 73 in 1966. Deng Xiaoping was a full decade
younger. If China could have instituted
a 改革开放
in 1966 wouldn’t China be a different story today?
One can say a lot about “what if in 1966….”
You could argue that if 改革开放 had happened in 1966, China would be weaker and more conservative today.
ReplyDeleteOnly with the shear destruction of Chinese traditional culture and society that occurred during the Cultural Revolution, did the "people" so fully support the new way forward under Deng Xiaoping. It wasn't the death toll (percentage wise there were a number of other times in Chinese history that were much worse). Instead, it was the overturning of society in the cities which were still like older China just with a red cloak. This had already occurred in the countryside in the 40s and 50s. Of course, this is now a problem in reverse in China. People have no grounding anymore except consumerism. So Confucianism and the like is being brought back, tough not so successfully.
If China had opened up in the 60's, US mfg would have stampeded to China by the late 70's. Corruption, disparity of income, would have come to the fore in the 80's, early 90's. I think the Chinese have been, were kept down by the economic system they had in place. The great contradiction in my view is that the Chinese political system was still way too conservative and raised in such an anti Western atmosphere that there is no way political reform could've kept pace with economic reform. That is where disruption would've come about. Go back and read my post the "First Monster". That lady was executed for a mere penance.
ReplyDeleteIt is ironic the Chinese leadership itself came to the conclusion that China was best served by mending things with America. That came about in the 68 or 69 timeframe.