Yes, there was a time when Zhou Enlai was Mao's boss....

Zhou was the undisputed leader of China's Communist Party.

The Comintern thought so.

He had the intelligence, and when times called for it, the ruthlessness to seek revenge.  He had the operational competency, and had proven himself an able administrator.  It was his idea to create an Intelligence Division.  He knew immediately the need for information.

He knew his enemy.  Chiang Kai Shek.

He knew how to mobilize and organize.  And he knew most of the players.  He knew Deng Xiaoping nearly fifteen years before Mao did.  Indeed, he had brought several future great leaders into the Party, such as Ye Jianying.

He also had a price on his head.  The Nationalists wanted badly to kill him.  What more street cred than that was necessary?

Well, it turns out his weakness if any was his lack of knowledge of China's Great Peasantry.  In my view, Zhou was simply too sophisticated and urbane for his own good.  At ease perhaps with the media, with foreigners, and able to speak a second language, it seems he simply lost touch with the peasantry.  But maybe that is too simply an answer.

So let's go to China's fallback position whenever something goes wrong;

Let's blame a foreigner for the "fall" of Zhou.

Let's blame Otto Braun.  The Last of the Laowai so to speak.  The last White Man in China to have any say in China's Party affairs.

It was his military strategy that got China's Red Army into trouble.  And Zhou went along with it.   Otto Braun wanted a static "maginot line" defense against CKS's KMT.  This in turn cost many casualties to the Red Army.

But we'll come back to this shortly.  Below, in line with many of my other posts, will be hopefully a simplified version of events, that led to the Rise of Mao.  We will also begin the story of Zhou and Mao from here.

The Communist leaders felt that success within China lay in the conquering of the cities.  But it was here, they took their largest losses.  This strategy nearly wiped their ability to fight.  It is at this time I believe Chiang Kai Shek was at his strongest.  Yet, irony of ironies, for all we know how CKS despised help from the Russians, the credit for nearly destroying the Communists wasn't even his.

Instead, it actually belonged to serious looking fellow named Hans Van Seeckt.   A retired German General.  It was he that created the strategy nearly wiping out Mao and everyone else. Did everyone catch another irony?  The military strategies of both sides were lead and formulated by Germans!

So Zhou, again the defacto leader of the CCP, has to retreat to the countryside with his colleagues.

Notice I do not use the word "minions".  Such is my respect for Zhou Enlai at this time, I cannot honestly believe he ruled with an iron fist.  More like a first among equals.

Meanwhile,  The Party retreats to a place called the Jiangxi Soviet.  A desolate area on the borders of Fujian and Jiangxi Provinces.

And who was the local warlord?  None other than Mao himself.  For all practical purposes he was indeed a warlord.  Or to be nice about it, simply the ruler of one of the remaining safe havens for the Chinese Army.

This is really where in my view Zhou and Mao first worked together in any serious way.  Now it is very important to state here that Mao was a well known and respected veteran of the Communist Party.  He was a very studious fellow of the Peasants' Condition within China.  His first wife had already been executed( though for all practical purposes he had already left her), and his seriousness to the cause held deeply with high esteem.

Yet while Zhou had around the same amount of time and experience with the Party as Mao did, there was no question Zhou was The Man.   Upon arriving to this temporary safe haven, he damn near had Mao imprisoned.   Mao, while running the show, had systemically ordered the death of tens of thousands of people.  Nearly all of them for the naive crime of opposing Mao. So Zhou and others believed.

Indeed the entire Chinese leadership opposed the way Mao handled things.  As such, Mao lost his positions of leadership within the Party.  And he was "criticized" to boot.  To undergo "criticism" within the Chinese Communist Party was the equivalent of being subject to a formal court of inquiry.

Among those he was formally criticized by? Peng DeHuai.  More about him at a later time. Actually, I have spoken about him in length here. One of the more infamous periods of recent Chinese History.  Even Lin Biao criticized Mao.  This episode was known as the Ningdu Conference.

Now let me utter a word about the Ningdu Conference.  People love to point out that Mao one by one took his revenge thirty years later on all these folks.  Everyone was there.   But if that is really the case, than what of Lin Biao?  He did pretty well didn't he? Up until he crashed his plane in Mongolia.

This period of Mao's life was probably the lowest point of his career.  Even lower than the period following the famine from 1959-62.  Of course, Mao was a comparative "nobody" in 1931. In 1962 he was definitely not a "nobody".

But things were to get worse for Mao, and everyone else.  This was really a bad time to be a Communist in China.  Quite simply, Chiang Kai Shek was whipping everyone's ass.  Notice I don't mention Mao's name here.  Why?  Because he wasn't worth mentioning!

As I alluded to earlier, Chiang had created a strategy for finally wiping out the CCP, courtesy of his German advisor.  And Otto Braun, the CCP's German, had arrive on the scene.  A reminder to everyone why the Chinese Communists put up with a damn laowai to begin with.  Simple, Money.  The Russian Comintern was at one time supplying 95% of the Communist budget.  And weapons.  But as the Communist Movement grew, they simply became more self reliant.

CKS's offensive attacks are really hurting the CCP.  He in effect wired off a great part of that area, along with guards.   Finally, a little known spy, who apparently knocked out four of own teeth on purpose in order to pose as a beggar, sneaked CKS's final offensive plans to the CCP.

When they learned of CKS's upcoming strategy, they fled.  This was the Long March.  The leaders were Zhou and Otto Braun.  And what of Mao?  I told you things were to get worse for him.  1932 and 1933 were Mao's Wilderness Years.  Not only did they not include him in the decision making process of the Long March, he didn't even know there was a Long March!  To add insult to injury, he only knew of such an action as it passed through his area.

He was figuratively still pouting on his doorstep when the file of troops marched past his house. Figured what was up, then joined them.

However, the Long March as we all know proved an initial disaster. 

Remember, Mao was not the leader of the Long March, nor did he even know it was taking place.  He never got the "memo".  But the losses of the Red Army eventually proved too much.   All Mao could do was "suggest" changes to Zhou, who listened.  Give Zhou credit for listening.  Eventually, Mao

The Zunyi Conference marks the beginning of Mao's rise back to power. It was at this conference when Mao finally began to be rehabilitated.  His personality, his experience, perhaps even a dearth of qualified and well seasoned cadres all led to his slow rise in status.  But also due to the humble nature of Zhou.  Many a leader would have seen Mao as a rising threat and conspire perhaps for his downfall.  Not Zhou.  And for this Zhou must be given credit.  He did not block Mao.  Did not thwart his rehabilitation.  Which many a cadre(Zhang Guotao?) would have done.

And for this he must be praised.  Remember, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Deng Xiaoping, even Lin Biao, all would have followed the lead of Zhou.  He was the leader.  And he had proven his worth.  Instead they fell in line. 

All to their eventual detriment.  It seems Mao chose not to remember their acquiescence during the March. 

However, the end result of the Zunyi Conference was only the ouster of Otto Braun from power, and the survival of Zhou, not the rise of Mao to supreme authority.   The time was Summer 1935.  Mao's Wilderness Years were over.  Yet his brother, Mao Zetan was dead, killed as a member of  the Red Army's rearguard. 

However, Mao now did have military control of this particular Red Army, small and pitiful though it was.  This time showed his military prowess.  Or the incompetency of CKS.  I think a bit more of the former than of the latter.  CKS simply could not count on the various warlords to help him.  Most of them had no interest in fighting CKS's battles.  Rather, their overriding goal was to horde their own armies strength for a later day.  Perhaps for when the Japanese came.  Or another more threatening warlord.  No one was worried about Mao, or his peasant Red Army.

And more so, no one seemed to lose any sleep about pissing off Chiang Kai Shek.

Mao's military talents in my view, the decisions he made, saved the day for the Communist Party survival in China.  Not only did he outmaneuver the KMT, he also made all the right decisions regarding the routes his troops took.  When to cross a river.  How many times.  When to backtrack.  Other larger Red Armies made foolish mistakes. Zhou's talent was simple. He let Mao be Mao.  HE stood out of the way.  Even though during the Long March Mao was at best only second in command. 

Yet by the time of their arrival into Shaanxi in November 1935, Mao's personality, his exploits, had earned him the role as Top Dog.  And that is how it stayed until 1976.